The term "Sahel" means "shore" in the Arabic language, about the southern edge of the "sea of sand" that is the Sahara. It is a geographical strip that extends from the Atlantic coast of Mauritania in the West to the Eritrean coast on the Red Sea in the East, that is approximately 7000 km, and whose variable depth separates the living dunes of the Sahara and the sub-Saharan savannah. It is a region of transition par excellence, once predominantly populated by nomads. The Muslim religion is omnipresent, alongside Christianity and various other local religious rites.
1. Roots of the Sahel crisis
Specialists point to different causes behind the deep crisis in the Sahel, including the disastrous effects of global warming on the traditional way of life of Sahelian populations. Indeed, extensive livestock farming, subsistence farming, and trade are simultaneously and negatively impacted by the decline in annual rainfall, the erratic nature of precipitation and its consequences and acceleration of desertification. This drastic reduction in economic resources is accompanied by a demographic explosion that will increase the population of the G5-Sahel countries (Burkina Faso, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, and Chad) alone from around 83 million in 2019 to 196 million in 2050. Environmental stress is perceptible in the increased tension between pastoralists tempted to descend more and more in the direction of the South in search of new pastures for their herds and of farmers faced with such pressure coupled with a decline in the quantities of water available and soil erosion. Thus, a sort of dynamic "Sahelisation" engulfed each year in areas of the sub-Saharan savannah that were formerly unsuitable for the practice of extensive breeding, exacerbating to the extreme a rivalry between herders and farmers, prevalent in the region. It is the case at the moment in the Luptako-Gourma area known as the “three borders area”, a territory of 370,000 km ^ 2, on the joint borders of Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger, a real security soft belly of the Sahel. Among the causes of the crisis in the Sahel, we can also cite latent political and ethnic tensions, notably in northern Mali dating back to the early sixties, the repercussions of political events that occurred in Algeria during the nineties of the last century and more recently the crisis in Libya. Indeed the collapse of the Libyan central state in 2011 not only created a geopolitical vacuum conducive to all kinds of exploitation detrimental to regional and global security, but it was also the source of the spread of Libyan arsenals across the Sahel, reputedly the most colossal ones in Africa. Groups, previously enlisted in the regular Libyan army, were able to reach, bag and baggage, their country of origin, in particular towards northern Mali, upsetting the balance of power on the ground in favour of a historic rebellion or a pre-existing terrorist group, and thus (further) weakening the territorial sovereignty of certain states in the region.
Drug trafficking to the lucrative markets of the North is also a causal element of the present crisis in the Sahel since the traditional (high) routes taken by this product are now hermetically closed, the drug trafficking networks have decided to establish new ones that pass through areas of “least resistance” security, ideally the Sahel, then Libya, then Mediterranean Europe and the Middle East. A form of collusion has gradually been established between, on the one hand, the networks of global traffickers, and many groups established in the Sahel, on another hand. The financial stakes are now irresistible for a local chef or a simple nomadic Sahelian pastoralist, because the fees collected in return for securing the transit of one ton of cannabis resin, can equal or exceed the cumulative fruits of a lifetime of hard work. From sober and resilient herders, some inhabitants of the Sahel have turned into an army of formidable drug smugglers, hostage-takers, traders of prohibited cigarettes or arms traffickers and illegal immigrants. It should be noted that with each ransom payment to release a hostage in the Sahel, the members of this veritable villainous ecosystem acquire additional logistical means allowing them to increase their radius of action to perpetrate new kidnappings and other violent acts, as demonstrated by the tragic events of March 13, 2016, in Grand Bassam, in Côte d'Ivoire. This is why Mauritania has constantly been against the payment of ransoms for the release of hostages in the Sahel, and this despite the great sensitivity of this question from a strictly humanitarian point of view and a political one, particularly in Western public opinions.
Contrary to a widespread thesis, the religious dimension in the Sahel crisis does not have all the preponderance that some people want to attribute to it, for an obvious reason: all the inhabitants of the historical centre of the Sahel crisis, northern Mali, are Sunni Muslims of Maliki rite. One can thus consider that militant proselytism could choose a better location across the planet, other than an Islamised region for ten centuries, because, according to the local saying, there is no need “to bring stones to the mountain”. In Mauritania, the expression "profit-making mafia activity, carried out under an Islamic dress" served (in official documents) to define the actions of AQIM in the Sahel. It is, however, true that foreign actors have had the time and the means to preach radical religious theses, without encountering the doctrinal resistance that one might expect, no doubt because of the ambient economic misery and the level of resentment of populations left to fend for themselves (no school, dispensary or security post), vis-à-vis certain local public authorities.
With the tricky guerrilla tactics in a geographic and social space that lends itself to it ideally, thanks in particular to the use of motorcycles and armed pickups, certain distraught political and military powers resort to the mobilization of "self-defence militia" following the tribal and ethnic divide; an sorcerer apprentice strategy that adds fuel to the fire and sometimes gives the security crisis in the Sahel the appearance of a latent civil war.
2. A Summary about Mauritania
A series of terrorist attacks against Mauritania was perpetrated between 2005 and 2011, as follows:
• June 4, 2005, the attack on Lemgheyty, by the GSPC (Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat) near the borders with Algeria and Mali, resulted in the death of 15 Mauritanian soldiers and nine terrorists
• December 24, 2007, four French tourists were brutally murdered by terrorists from AQIM (Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, the new name of the GSPC), near the city of Aleg
• December 27, 2007, the attack on a military target in Elghallaouya was the cause of the death of four Mauritanian soldiers
• September 14, 2008, 12 Mauritanian soldiers were killed during an ambush by AQIM in Tourine, near the mining northern town of Zouérate
• August 25, 2010, a vehicle crammed with explosives refused to obey the warning shots from the barracks of Néma, in the extreme south-east of Mauritania, and exploded at the entrance of the barracks, without causing any victims, other than their occupants
• from 17 to 19 September 2010 and to counter an imminent attack against this same garrison of Néma, the Mauritanian army launched a ground operation in Hassi Sidi then in Ras-el-maa, in Mali
• November 29, 2010, three Spanish aid workers were kidnapped, "on behalf of" AQIM, on the Nouakchott-Nouadhibou road
• January 29 and February 2, 2011, a double attack targeting the Ministry of National Defence and the French Embassy in Nouakchott, was foiled in extremis, at the gates of Nouakchott, after two vehicles stuffed with explosives (1.5 ton each) were neutralized by the Mauritanian armed forces
• in June-July 2011, the Mauritanian army successfully launched a major military operation that lasted a fortnight, against a large AQIM base in the Malian forest of Wagadou, near the border between the two countries.
• December 20, 2011, gendarme Ely Ould Mokhtar was kidnapped by an AQIM commando in Adel Bagrou, about 1,400 km from Nouakchott, a stone's throw from the Malian border
• During this same period, another half a dozen various security incidents, involving AQIM or its “proxies”, were also recorded at the level of the road axes and in certain outlying locations of the country (Cheggatt, Tamchekett…).
Given the above, it can be noted that Mauritania was the first country in the G5-Sahel, to have suffered the full brunt of the deadly attacks of terrorism from the North and East, starting in 2005, taking the armed forces by surprise national under-trained and under-equipped to face this new type of asymmetric security challenge, especially between 2005 and 2010. As an illustration, credible testimonies state, at the time, almost insurmountable logistical difficulties for the Mauritanian armed forces to learn in real-time the serious outrages suffered by small isolated garrisons in the far North-East of the country, under the blows of a GSPC and his accomplices, masters of the field. To deliver first aid or reinforcements, during some of these attacks, the Mauritanian army used vulnerable means of transporting goods, borrowed from local businessmen. But as evidenced by the failures of the operations of February 2011, against the Ministry of National Defence and the French Embassy in Nouakchott, and the military garrison of Néma in August 2011, and the exemplary success of the daring preventive strike against the base of Wagadu in Mali, the Mauritanian army not only succeeded, from 2010, in thwarting terrorist attacks on its territory, but also in delivering decisive blows to the enemy, including at the level of its bases deemed impregnable, deep in the Malian territory.
3. Mauritanian security "miracle"
On the side-lines of his recent visit to the United Arab Emirates, the President of the Republic, His Excellency Mohamed Ould Cheikh El-Ghazouani said, during an interview with the newspaper "El Ittihad": "We have faced terrorism in Mauritania, through the adoption of a global strategy with security, economic and intellectual dimensions”. Indeed, for ten years, Mauritania has not experienced the slightest terrorist incident, despite a particularly restrictive geopolitical context. With an area of more than a million square kilometres, largely desert, no less than 5000 km of borders, including about 2200 with Mali, 1500 with the territory of Western Sahara, 800 with Senegal and 460 with Algeria, an Atlantic seaboard stretching over 750 km, reputed to be the most fish-rich in the world, straddling a clandestine immigration route towards the nearby Canary Islands, Mauritania may, at first glance, seem "unsecurable", especially when we take into account its huge mineral resources (gold, iron, copper, phosphate, uranium ...) sometimes just under the ground. Like a large tent erected in the middle of the desert, potentially exposed to the fury of all-out elements, Mauritania, at the crossroads of North Africa, sub-Saharan Africa, the Sahel, and the Atlantic Ocean, faces with dignity its destiny, helped in this by this legendary resilience specific to the inhabitants of this part of the world. If the country has miraculously succeeded in escaping the terrorist trap, it is largely thanks to such resilience expressed in the “National strategy to combat terrorism and cross-border crime”, a strategy summarized in an official document of 31 pages (it will be discussed later). The difficult accessibility of its territory and its geographic position outside the main seasonal transhumance zone of Sahelian herders heading south and recent extensions of this zone, under pressure from drastic climate change, are, among other specific features, in favour of Mauritanian security.
From a geostrategic point of view, Mauritania represents this precious security "lock", the preservation of which constitutes a major issue of regional and international peace and stability, a fact unanimously accepted and regularly recalled by the main actors concerned.
Four national languages (Arabic, Poular, Soninké, and Wolof) are spoken in the country, a cultural diversity providing stability and security. Indeed, thanks to its multi-ethnic character, Mauritanian society is sheltered from destabilising influences from the North, such as the famous “Arab Spring”, because it is not entirely Arab, as it escapes from those from the South because it is not completely sub-Saharan. Such a dual membership is not without interest with respect to other key areas. The early adoption by the Mauritanian authorities of the "National Strategy to Combat Terrorism and Transnational Crime" constitutes, without a doubt, the main explanatory element of the Mauritanian security exception in the Sahel. The first pillar of this strategy was the upgrading of the defence and security forces, in particular through the establishment of Special Intervention Groups (GSI), light and flexible units that have rendered the tactical superiority of hostile and fleeting pickups obsolete, pickups often driven by hired drivers, great connoisseurs of the Sahel-Saharan terrain, and also thanks to the acquisition of military aircraft, capable of projecting quickly to any point of the national territory and making a difference when facing to a once intangible enemy. As a result of this reform package, the security equation in the Sahel was quickly “re-parameterised”, in terms more favourable to Mauritania.
One of the milestones of this multidimensional approach was the painstaking adoption by parliament, in July 2010, of the law n ^ 2010-035 against terrorism; this law, of which eleven of its articles had been initially revoked by the Constitutional Council, was finally approved by the National Assembly with 20 votes "for" and 15 "against", 75 deputies of the majority - out of 95 - have been curiously absent during this crucial vote. The imposition of a “biometric” civil register, the establishment of compulsory border crossing points and the creation of new Moughataa (departments), among other administrative measures, have enabled better control of the territory, as part of the new strategy. An exceptional climate of individual and collective freedom, in the age of triumphant "social networks", serves as a "safety valve" to ease social or political tensions, real or simulated. A proactive policy in favour of the inhabitants of pockets of great poverty has been initiated and continues to be strengthened, intending to alleviate the suffering of the populations concerned and permanently drying up the sources of recruitment for the benefit of terrorist movements.
On another level, a series of inclusive symposia, the first of which, the “National debate on terrorism and extremism”, held from October 24 to 28, 2010, under the aegis of the Ministry of National Defence, in collaboration with the 'University of Nouakchott, was organized. Another conference on extremism took place from August 19 to 20, 2015, again in Nouakchott, in the presence of a dozen representatives from Maghreb and Sahel countries, in addition to France and the United States of America. Other similar reflections have since been carried out, with the participation of the public authorities concerned, theologians, members of civil society and experts, the most recent of which was that held under the theme “African ulemas: tolerance and moderation against extremism and violence ”, from 21 to 23 January 2020, in the presence of representatives of many African countries. Mauritania has thus gradually become the regional centre of gravity concerning the doctrinal parade to extremist religious rhetoric in the Sahel. It was following one of these seminars, held between 5 and 8 January 2010, on the theme "Islam and religious extremism", that an innovative component of the strategy was launched on 18 January 2010; it was a "doctrinal dialogue", conducted inside the Nouakchott Central Prison, with 67 Salafist detainees, some of whom had participated in attacks. This activity, organized under the aegis of the Ministry of Islamic Affairs with the participation of religious scholars, was responding to a call previously made by 47 of these detainees for "spiritual discussions" with scholars. A daring process of "deradicalisation" which proved conclusive, because only two prisoners among those who took part in this dialogue, refused to "repent" and therefore remained in prison. Note that the detainees who committed assassinations had been excluded from this religious dialogue, despite the insistence of their comrades.
As part of their opening towards places of worship, the Mauritanian public authorities had decided to recruit several hundred imams and muezzins, for the benefit of the country's mosques.
Thanks to this multidimensional strategy, Mauritania escaped a terrorist enterprise of which it was, in all likelihood, the first potential victim.
European countries, such as Spain and France have decided to revise their instructions on tourist trips to Mauritania, instructions issued during the "peak" of the terrorist incidents of 2009-2010. Today that the security situation is permanently under control, it would be desirable that the British government makes a similar move; thus allowing British tourists to profit from a restorative stay in an oasis of Adrar or the fabulous park of Arguin on the Atlantic Ocean or to appreciate Oualata's millenary cuisine, in a dining room featuring the exceptional local women's art of wall painting, or any other destination in a country known for the legendary hospitality of its inhabitants and its refined taste for poetry ...
4. From national security to regional security
When Mauritania has successfully achieved the tour de force to secure its territory over time, by ousting the terrorist gangs and dissuading the perpetrators of hostile smuggling incursions from the North and East from venturing into its " prohibited military zones ", it has acquired the authority and the legitimacy to speak on the subject of sub-regional security, on the African and international scenes; an Ivorian wisdom states: " when your neighbour’s hut burns down, help him put out the fire lest it attack yours”. A diplomatic dimension was thus added to the Mauritanian approach to peace and security. It was therefore quite logical that the first conference of the “AU Mission for Mali and the Sahel” was launched in Nouakchott, on March 17, 2013, with the participation of eleven Sahel-Saharan countries and international partners. On this occasion, the Nouakchott Process, a variation of the “African Architecture of Peace and Security”, in the Sahel, was agreed on. This conference was held, two months after the launch, on January 11, 2013, of the French military operation Serval, without which the armed groups in Mali, reinforced by the freshly arrived supports of Libya, would have "Somalised" not only Mali, but far beyond, deep into West Africa ...
Following UN Security Council Resolution 2100, dated April 25, 2013, the Multidimensional Integrated Stabilisation Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) was established. The rules of engagement for this peace mission, the fruit of intense negotiations, mainly between the five permanent members of the Security Council, did not seem to meet the expectations of the leaders of the region. Moreover, a later report on the evaluation of the effectiveness of this mission would qualify it as "the deadliest" of all similar missions. It is in this context, teeming with initiatives and apprehensions, especially on the Sahelian side, that the creation, on February 16, 2014, of the G5 Sahel should be noted, thanks to a summit of leaders from Burkina Faso, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, and Chad, in Nouakchott. In addition to the reservations already mentioned regarding the MINUSMA mission, these leaders highlighted the necessary coupling of the security dimension with that of development, to increase the chances of a resolution, in the medium term, of the economic and environmental, largely at the origin, in their eyes, of the crisis in the Sahel. With a permanent secretariat based in Nouakchott, the G5 Sahel now has several political, military and economic initiatives to its credit, the most important being, without doubt, the creation, on July 2, 2017, in Bamako, of a Joint Force (FC-G5Sahel). A force (1000 soldiers by country) dedicated to combating, together, terrorism, transnational organized crime, and human trafficking, with a right of hot pursuit of 50 km inside borders of the neighbouring country.
The operationalisation of this regional force, in three “zones” (East [Chad-Niger], Centre [Burkina Faso-Niger-Mali] and West [Mali-Mauritania]), experienced many delays, for political and logistical reasons, because some permanent members of the Security Council did not welcome the inclusion of such a force under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, a requirement firmly and unanimously defended by the leaders of the five countries members. On June 20, 2017, at the initiative of France, the Security Council "welcomed" the new force, without providing a definitive solution to the method of its financing. In summary, the Council, in this case, gave its "authorisation", without giving a "mandate". Despite conclusive actions on the ground, this regional force is slow to gain momentum precisely because of the two reasons mentioned earlier: the ambiguity of its status from the UN point of view and the lack of visibility as to the question of the funding. However, once taken into account in the context of the necessary operational synergy between the various forces present in the Sahel, this regional force could surprise many detractors on the international scene.
In this sub-regional dynamic in favour of peace and security, Mauritania, as we have seen, has played and still plays fully its role as a country "supplier" of good practices.
The Sahel region, often presented under the almost exclusive angle of the security threat or marginally of the high percentage (around 80%) of its nationals in the composition of clandestine migrants in the direction of southern Europe, represents, in reality, one of the most promising energy horizons on the planet, contains colossal mineral resources, has a substantial integrated market and an enviable demographic dividend.
In its new global post-Brexit diplomacy, the United Kingdom, a permanent member of the UN Security Council and undisputed scientific, industrial and financial power, has, in Mauritania, a credible strategic ally at the gates of the Sahel, and, far beyond, the Maghreb and sub-Saharan Africa. The President of the Republic, HE Mohamed Ould Cheikh El-Ghazouani, recently recalled this extraordinary potential for Mauritanian-British cooperation, during an intervention within the framework of the “UK-Africa Investment Summit”, held in London, January 20, 2020.
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